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CODE HARASSMENT NEEDS A TEXAS-SIZED SOLUTION
David Seth Morrison†
Abstract
Municipal Code Enforcement exists to abate nuisances and resolve conflicts between neighbors. Code enforcement often discovers
nuisances through citizen complaints. Cities and code enforcement departments have taken great lengths to protect complainants from retaliation, but these protections have extended too far and created a
problem in reverse. Code harassment occurs when people make excessive or false reports to code enforcement departments to harass
neighbors. Code enforcement officers do their jobs and investigate the
complaints leading to visits and fines. Many people are shocked to find
they can do nothing to stop the harassment save leaving their residence because the law offers no protection against such behavior.
With a focus on Texas, this Comment looks at the three causes that
enable code harassment, places them within the larger framework of
code compliance reform that has occurred in the past twenty years,
and offers a framework for creating solutions, including reforming the
Texas Citizens Participation Act, establishing confidential code enforcement reporting, and creating a vexatious reporter law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a resident of San Antonio’s Beacon Hill neighborhood
created a “fearful environment.”1 As neighbors repaired their driveways, the resident would stand in front of the neighbor’s properties
with a tape measure to ensure the repairs conformed to the city code.2
A man bought a building he had lived in as a tenant for years, only to
discover that the resident was reporting him to the city for such offenses as parking his car in front of his building.3 An elderly woman,
who had lived in the neighborhood for 50 years, felt forced to leave
“because she felt that [she had] been driven out of the neighborhood.”4
The issue became so pervasive that the neighborhood association,
code compliance department, and city council revised the Neighborhood Conservation District plan in 2017 to alleviate the resident’s behavior.5
1. Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance Harassment,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com/news
/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businesses-cry-code-compliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; BEACON HILL AREA NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICT,

2022]

CODE HARASSMENT NEEDS A TEXAS-SIZED SOLUTION

143

The resident’s actions against neighbors are an example of what
this Comment calls “code harassment.”6 In such situations, a person
makes an overwhelming number of reports to local municipal code
enforcement agencies against another person.7 Code enforcement officers, in attempting to perform their jobs, become tools in neighborhood disputes.8 Sometimes, officers recognize that they are “becoming involved in what they define as private disputes.”9 Other times,
officers may find it difficult to separate the harassment from genuine
complaints; consider an incident in Florida where an officer issued a
warning “for feeding ducks in [her] back yard instead of on the water,
as city codes prescribe.”10
The effects of code harassment are far reaching. First, code harassment wastes city resources as overburdened code compliance departments investigate large volumes of harassing complaints.11 Second, citizens suffer as code compliance officers send letters, knock on
their doors, enter and search their property, issue fines, and take legal
actions against them.12 Oftentimes, this causes people to forfeit their
BEACON HILL AREA NCD PLAN 2017 REVISIONS, at 2 (June 22, 2017), https:/
/www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/Planning/NPUD/NCD5_BeaconHill.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3XE-Z5VW].
6. See Bob LaMendola, Vengeful Neighbors Trigger ‘Code Terrorism,’ S. FLA.
SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 1989), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-198904-30-8901220735-story.html [https://perma.cc/CKQ9-QYX4].
7. See id.
8. See id.; Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance Harassment, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com/news/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businessescry-code-compliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV].
9. H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement as Law in Action, 17 L. &
POL’Y 133, 143 (1995) [hereinafter Law in Action].
10. See Bob LaMendola, Vengeful Neighbors Trigger ‘Code Terrorism,’ S. FLA.
SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 1989), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-198904-30-8901220735-story.html [https://perma.cc/CKQ9-QYX4].
11. See generally H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 16 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 29, 39 (1996) [hereinafter Urban Decline] (“The code is very much underenforced due to community and inspection agency resource limitations . . . . An inspector’s luckiest discovery is that an
address is outside the city limits.”); Marie Saavedra, Mayor Acts as Code Compliance Representative for a Day in West Dallas, WFAA (Feb. 27, 2020), https:/
/www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/dallas-mayor-puts-eyes-on-the-problem-of-neglected-properties/287-509695c2-99e6-4331-94af-f3063305dd34 [https://perma.cc
/XA96-UB86] (quoting Dallas Mayor Eric Johnson stating, “I think one of the biggest barriers is just manpower and time. It’s a big city and code violations can be
many.”).
12. See generally Dallas News Administrator, Sounding Off: Is Code Enforced
in Your Neighborhood?, THE DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 21, 2013, 11:00 AM),
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homes and property and leave an area to avoid further harassment.13
Finally, judicial resources are wasted as citizens attempt to fight code
enforcement and harassing neighbors with inadequate means.14
Although code harassment seems confined to neighborhood disputes, the internet has provided a transnational and national platform
for code harassers.15 In 2016, a concentrated campaign led by anonymous, “self-proclaimed ‘Right Wing Safety Squads’” found on the
website 4chan16 closed down local Do-It-Yourself (“DIY”) spaces—
unsanctioned and makeshift locations where “marginalized and transgressive groups”17 gathered to play and hear music—in Toronto, “Baltimore, Denver, Fort Worth, Richmond, Knoxville, [and] Nashville.”18
Group members would locate videos of DIY events online and identify
and report fire and building hazards to local authorities.19 A 4-chan
thread explained the rationale of the “Right Wing Safety Squads” actions, stating, “[DIY Spaces] are open hotbeds of liberal radicalism
and degeneracy and now YOU can stop them by reporting all such
places you may be or may become aware of to the authorities . . . .”20
The rise of the internet and the ease of anonymous communication

https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2013/07/21/sounding-off-is-code-enforced-inyour-neighborhood/ [https://perma.cc/UBV4-7VD6] (“No matter what is done, nobody will be happy, so get used to it.”); Bob LaMendola, Vengeful Neighbors Trigger ‘Code Terrorism,’ S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 1989), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1989-04-30-8901220735-story.html
[https://perma.cc
/CKQ9-QYX4] (“I live on Social Security. I’m so sick I don’t care if they put me in
jail. Who would do something like that?”).
13. See generally Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance
Harassment, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com/news/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businessescry-code-compliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV]; Robert F.
Blomquist, Extreme American Neighborhood Law, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 407
(2009) (citing Clanton v. Carr, No. A104203, 2004 WL 2988609, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 28, 2004)) (illustrating where general harassment from a neighbor forced
a family to relocate after three years).
14. See generally in re Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d 530, 536–37 (Tex App.—Fort Worth
2013, pet. denied) (suing for defamation, business disparagement, and civil conspiracy).
15. See Sara Gwendolyn Ross, Transgressive DIY (“Do-It-Yourself”) Spaces,
Mixed Virtual/Physical Affinity Spaces, and Building Code Vigilantism, 13 ALB.
GOV’T. L. REV. 233, 262 (2019) [hereinafter DIY].
16. Id. at 261.
17. Id. at 275.
18. Id. at 259–61.
19. Id. at 262.
20. Id. at 263.
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have allowed code harassment to expand from a limited neighborhood
scope into a potential tool for silencing political opponents.21
Within the past two decades, legal scholars and activists have criticized and called for reform of code enforcement policy.22 Code enforcement departments have implemented many of these reforms,
however, the conversation has excluded code harassment and its
causes.23
This Comment seeks to incorporate code harassment into the literature surrounding code enforcement because current code enforcement reform efforts have fallen short. Accordingly, the Comment proposes solutions that lawmakers and code enforcement agencies should
adopt in the future. Code enforcement is not uniform across the United
States,24 so this Comment focuses on Texas as an illustrative case
study of the problem and proposes potential solutions in the hopes that
other states and cities can modify and enact similar measures.
Four sections comprise this Comment. Section II provides a general overview of code enforcement agencies and a description of code
enforcement in various Texas cities. Section III sets out the three problems—abatement, officer discretion, and neighborhood discord—that
scholars and organizations have identified over the past two decades
with code enforcement and explains their connection to code harassment. Section IV analyzes the three components that enable code harassment in Texas: the Texas Citizens Participation Act, anonymous
reporting, and the lack of a clear cause of action. Finally, Section V
proposes three solutions that would address code harassment: amending the Texas Citizens Participation Act, transitioning from anonymous reporting to confidential reporting, and creating a vexatious reporter law which would allow people to directly address code
harassment in court. Addressing code harassment is important because
21. See id. at 262; Jonathan Simmons, What to Do When Code Enforcement Becomes a Weapon?, PALM COAST OBSERVER (July 8, 2015), https://www.palmcoastobserver.com/article/what-do-when-code-enforcement-becomes-weapon
[https://perma.cc/2QH8-XZK6].
22. See generally Marilyn L. Uzdavines, Barking Dogs: Code Enforcement is
All Bark and No Bite (Unless the Inspectors Have Assault Rifles), 54 WASHBURN
L.J. 161 (2014); Urban Decline, supra note 11; Jonathan Simmons, What to Do
When Code Enforcement Becomes a Weapon?, PALM COAST OBSERVER (July 8,
2015), https://www.palmcoastobserver.com/article/what-do-when-code-enforcement-becomes-weapon [https://perma.cc/2QH8-XZK6].
23. See generally Uzdavines, supra note 22; Urban Decline, supra note 11.
24. See Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 168.
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it will offer relief to victims25 and prevent code harassment from enlarging into a tool that individuals and groups use to accomplish invidious objectives, such as silencing political opponents26 or segregating communities.27
II. MUNICIPAL CODE ENFORCEMENT
Texas provides an excellent definition of Code Enforcement
as the inspection of public or private premises for the purpose
of identifying environmental hazards, including: fire or
health hazards; nuisance violations; unsafe building conditions; and violations of any fire, health, or building regulation, statute, or ordinance; and improving and rehabilitating
those premises with regard to those hazards.28
This Section explains how code enforcement agencies generally
accomplish this goal before comparing code enforcement in the Texas
cities of Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Lubbock.
A. General Overview
Code enforcement is an issue that cuts right to the heart of everyday life and impacts everybody within a community. In Dallas, Texas,
for instance, Mayor Eric Johnson spent an entire day as a code compliance officer to see how the department resolved the 300,000 complaints it receives each year.29 During his stint as an officer, Johnson
saw a vacant lot filled with “trash, tires, and a broken fence” and stated
that this was “certainly one of the things you hear about the most because it gets right to people’s quality of life.”30 Johnson’s focus on
various forms of trash illustrates the primary purpose of code
25. Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance Harassment,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com/news
/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businesses-cry-code-compliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV].
26. See DIY, supra note 15, at 260–62.
27. See Francisco Alvarado, Lake Worth Uses Cops, Code Enforcement in Brazen Effort to Get Rid of City’s Poor, FLA. BULLDOG (Mar. 5, 2019), https:/
/www.floridabulldog.org/2019/03/lake-worth-uses-cops-code-enforcement-in-brazen-effort-to-get-rid-of-citys-poor/ [https://perma.cc/RPE8-5TAP].
28. TEX. OCC. CODE § 1952.001(1).
29. Marie Saavedra, Mayor Acts as Code Compliance Representative for a Day
in West Dallas, WFAA (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local
/dallas-mayor-puts-eyes-on-the-problem-of-neglected-properties/287-509695c299e6-4331-94af-f3063305dd34 [https://perma.cc/XA96-UB86].
30. Id.
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enforcement: to resolve nuisances and get people to comply with the
law, whether by choice or through various forms of force.31 Code cases
that end up out of an officer’s hand, in court for instance, are viewed
as failures because compliance was not reached.32
1. Types of Issues
Code enforcement officers confront both internal and external issues.33 Internal issues are those that people, mostly tenants, complain
about within their own dwellings, “for example, lack of adequate
heat.”34 Such issues fall under the purview of the warranty of habitability and exist to hold landlords accountable for the state of properties.35 External issues are those that people complain about outside
their own dwellings or about other people, such as trash or tall grass.36
Such issues fall under the purview of nuisance law and are designed
to uphold health and safety within the community.37
2. Identifying Code Violations
Most code enforcement agencies in the United States operate as
complaint-driven systems.38 A complaint-driven system relies heavily
on community involvement to selectively enforce city ordinances
where needed rather than proactively searching for violations.39 Code
enforcement officers respond to individual complaints so that each
neighborhood can determine what it will tolerate for itself.40 For example, if a person lives “in an area where it’s OK for a trailer” to be
in the front yard, then nobody will complain.41 Such systems encourage the community to police itself and allow code enforcement to
31. Law in Action, supra note 9, at 149; JULIUS ZSAKO, CODE ENFORCEMENT
BEST PRACTICES: SAFETY, CUSTOMER SERVICE & COMMUNICATIONS 6 (2018).
32. Law in Action, supra note 9, at 153.
33. Id. at 140.
34. Id.
35. Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between
Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y. 33, 40 (2006).
36. Law in Action, supra note 9, at 140.
37. See id. at 134; ZSAKO, supra note 31, at 10.
38. Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 163–64.
39. Id.
40. Betsy Calvert, Code Enforcement Starts With Neighbors, Ends With Government, SUN PORT CHARLOTTE (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.yoursun.com/charlotte
/news/code-enforcement-starts-with-neighbors-ends-with-government/article
_217c3096-4a70-11e9-96ba-ab64eac85ce6.html [https://perma.cc/CGB3-XDNF].
41. Id.
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adopt a hands-off approach.42 As one Dallas resident stated, code enforcement officers cannot magically know a problem exists unless citizens “help the city help us.”43
A minority of code enforcement agencies adopt proactive systems.44 One such method is the use of periodic inspections where inspectors designate a time period to go block by block through an area
looking for violations.45 Periodic inspections, however, are time consuming, expensive, and often impossible to accomplish with the limited personnel code enforcement agencies have at their disposal.46
Another method is geographic inspections, where inspectors focus on the areas that often have the most violations.47 This method
addresses “the neediest areas” of the community and can compensate
for a lack of reporting but fails to address needs in other parts of the
community.48
Complaint-driven systems often must adopt some elements of
proactive enforcement to avoid discrimination claims.49 A code enforcement officer will, for instance, respond to a complaint and, after
inspecting the reported property, survey the area for similar violations
before leaving to avoid charges of discrimination or favoritism.50 Such
accompanying practices can often cause friction between officers and
community members who feel as though officers patrol the streets
looking for any excuse to harass them.51

42. See id.
43. Dallas News Administrator, Sounding Off: Is Code Enforced in Your Neighborhood?, THE DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 21, 2013, 11:00 AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2013/07/21/sounding-off-is-code-enforced-in-your-neighborhood/ [https://perma.cc/UBV4-7VD6].
44. Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 163.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Bob LaMendola, Vengeful Neighbors Trigger ‘Code Terrorism,’ S. FLA. SUN
SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 1989), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1989-04-30
-8901220735-story.html [https://perma.cc/CKQ9-QYX4].
50. See Betsy Calvert, Code enforcement starts with neighbors, ends with government, SUN PORT CHARLOTTE (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.yoursun.com/charlotte/news/code-enforcement-starts-with-neighbors-ends-with-government/article
_217c3096-4a70-11e9-96ba-ab64eac85ce6.html [https://perma.cc/CGB3-XDNF].
51. See Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 163–64.

2022]

CODE HARASSMENT NEEDS A TEXAS-SIZED SOLUTION

149

3. Gaining Compliance
After discovering a violation, a code enforcement officer first issues a notice of violation to the noncomplier.52 A notice of violation
is a single letter or series of letters sent to a noncomplier and includes
the noncomplier’s name, “a brief description of the code violation,” “a
request to eliminate the code violation by a date certain,” and “a brief
quote from the code which describes the violation . . . [and] penalties
for non-compliance.”53
After sending out the notice of violation, code enforcement officers will generally default to negotiating with the noncomplier.54 Justifying this default approach, one code compliance officer stated, “I
don’t have anyone in court. If they get to court they stop working on
the building. I want to work with them.”55 The approach also comes
from a belief that community outreach creates “a positive atmosphere
[leading] to safer and more attractive communities, thereby helping to
foster better places in which to live, work, play and invest.”56
When negotiation fails, violators can end up in court before a
judge who assesses a fine for the violation.57 Some code enforcement
departments have the authority to fix nuisances themselves and charge
the costs to the noncomplier using a lien on the property.58
B. Texas Perspective
Code enforcement in Texas is a regulated occupation.59 Code enforcement officers in Texas are licensed and registered and must undergo continuing training and education.60 Code enforcement officers
52. INT’L CODE COUNCIL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CODE ADMINISTRATION 42–43
(2017).
53. ZSAKO, supra note 31, at 47; See also INT’L CODE COUNCIL, supra note 52,
at 42–45.
54. Urban Decline, supra note 11, at 36–37
55. Id. at 37.
56. ZSAKO, supra note 31, at 6–7.
57. Law in Action, supra note 9, at 153–54; Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 171.
58. See FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. B, art. II, §§ 11A-52 to
-54 (2021).
59. TEX. OCC. CODE § 1952.001.
60. Id. § 1952.051(a)–(b) (an executive director and commission is required to
enforce and create standards and educational requirements); Id. §§ 1952.102–.103
(setting out licensing requirements to become a code enforcement officer); Id. §
1952.1051 (requiring continuing education and training for code enforcement officials); Id. § 1952.151 (stating conditions for suspending or revoking a code enforcement official’s license).
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are distinctly different from police officers, despite conducting investigations, imposing fines on people for infractions, and often working
in the same building.61
Despite state regulation of code enforcement licensing, code enforcement officers operate differently from city to city based on the
city ordinance code.62 In Fort Worth, for instance, code enforcement
operates as its own independent department.63 The department operates on a complaint-driven system,64 but checking on the status of a
complaint requires a complainant to submit their identity with the
complaint.65 The “Fort Worth Code Rangers,” a volunteer system
where code enforcement officers train concerned citizens in the community to report violations, supplements Fort Worth’s complaint
driven system.66 After discovering a violation and issuing a notice of
violation, officers may abate the nuisances themselves, provide subsequent notice of the abatement to owners, and place liens on property
to cover the abatement expenses.67
In San Antonio, code enforcement operates as its own independent department.68 The department operates on a complaint-driven
61. See Code Enforcement, CITY OF EL PASO, https://www.elpasotexas.gov/police-department/code-compliance [https://perma.cc/L2BX-95DT]; TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE § 2.12 (Texas law recognizes thirty-five different positions as police
officers and none include code enforcement officers); TEX. OCC. CODE § 1952.003
(“This state or a political subdivision of this state may engage in code enforcement
without employing a person registered under this chapter.”); Experience Requirements, TEX. DEP’T OF LICENSING & REGUL., https://www.tdlr.texas.gov/ceo
/ceofaq.htm [https://perma.cc/G63Z-7E5D] (a police officer must make a “career
change” to be a code enforcement officer).
62. See generally, FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. B, art. II, §§
11A-6 to -101 (2020); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE ch. 1,
§§ 101.1–604.3 (2020).
63. FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. B, art. II, § 11A-6 (2020).
64. Request a City Service, FORT WORTH, https://fortworth-csrprodcwi.motorolasolutions.com/servicerequest.mvc/srintake
[https://perma.cc/LFJ38AAX].
65. Check Service Request Status, FORT WORTH, https://fortworth-csrprodcwi.motorolasolutions.com/StatusCheck.mvc/StatusCheck [https://perma.cc/A65FEYV5].
66. Code Rangers, FORT WORTH, http://cctfortworth.org/coderangers
/#:~:text=The%20Code%20Rangers%20program%20seeks,reports%20of%20suspected%20code%20violations [https://perma.cc/RRL3-5UWT].
67. FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. B, art. II, §§ 11A-52 to -54
(2020).
68. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE, ch. 1, §§ 101.1–104.6
(2018) (established through the San Antonio Property Maintenance Code, also called
the Development Services Department).
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system, but does not foreclose proactive inspection.69 After discovering a violation, officers must serve a notice of violation on the violator,
bring the violator into court if the violation is not fixed, and impose a
fine “not less than one hundred dollars and not more than two thousand
dollars.”70 The code does “not preclude the City Attorney from instituting appropriate action to restrain, correct or abate a violation.”71
In Lubbock, code enforcement operates as a subdivision of the
city’s environmental inspection services.72 The city reporting system
is not anonymous because it requires calling or signing into an online
account in order to submit a complaint.73 At times, the code enforcement department goes out into the community looking for violations.74
After discovering a violation, officers may abate the nuisances within
one year of notice, provide subsequent notice to owners of the abatement, and charge the owner for abatement.75
Enforcement systems and the anonymity of reporting systems
separate the three cities above. Both Fort Worth and Lubbock enforce
the city code through abating nuisances and charging the property
owner,76 while San Antonio fines property owners for non-compliance.77 Fort Worth depends on a complaint-based system,78 while San
Antonio and Lubbock use a mixture of proactive and complaint-based

69. Code Enforcement Process, SAN ANTONIO, https://www.sanantonio.gov/ces
/Services [https://perma.cc/X5TY-KPFK].
70. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE ch. 1, §§ 106.1–106.6
(2018).
71. Id. at § 106.5.
72. LUBBOCK, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 34, § 34.02.031 (2020).
73. Code Enforcement, LUBBOCK, https://ci.lubbock.tx.us/departments/code-enforcement/services [https://perma.cc/WQ4A-PKAV].
74. Avery Travis, Code Enforcement on the Lookout for Violations, KAMC
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.everythinglubbock.com/news/kamc-news/codeenforcement-on-the-lookout-for-violations/ [https://perma.cc/XUK4-85HY].
75. LUBBOCK, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 34, § 34.02.035 (2020).
76. See FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. B, art. II, §§ 11A-52 to
-54 (2019); LUBBOCK, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 34, § 34.02.035 (2020).
77. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE ch. 1, § 106.4
(2018).
78. See Request a City Service, FORT WORTH, https://fortworth-csrprodcwi.motorolasolutions.com/servicerequest.mvc/srintake
[https://perma.cc/LFJ38AAX]; Code Rangers, FORT WORTH, http://cctfortworth.org/coderangers
/#:~:text=The%20Code%20Rangers%20program%20seeks,reports%20of%20suspected%20code%20violations [https://perma.cc/RRL3-5UWT] (requiring registered Fort Worth residents to search for violations and submit complaints to Fort
Worth Code Enforcement).
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systems.79 Lubbock does not use anonymous complaints,80 while both
San Antonio and Fort Worth allow the submission of anonymous complaints.81
III. MODERN CODE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
Scholars have identified three major problems with modern code
enforcement: inadequate abatement procedures, officer discretion, and
failure to resolve neighborhood disputes.82 This Section discusses
each of these problems with both proposed and enacted solutions and
further explains how these problems inadequately address code harassment.
A. Abatement
Code enforcement’s purpose is compliance.83 Scholars have criticized code enforcement mechanisms, such as San Antonio’s fine system, as ineffective because they prevent noncompliers from addressing issues.84 For example, Professor Marilyn L. Uzdavines provides
the example of a homeowner who had to move for foreclosure to avoid
jail time for failing to repair her damaged roof.85 The homeowner’s
house was in foreclosure when the roof was damaged,86 but code enforcement still cited her, ordered her to make repairs, and threatened
to incarcerate her.87 The homeowner could not fix her roof because
79. See Code Enforcement Process, SAN ANTONIO, https://www.sanantonio.gov
/ces/Services [https://perma.cc/X5TY-KPFK]; Code Enforcement, LUBBOCK, https:
//ci.lubbock.tx.us/departments/code-enforcement/services [https://perma.cc/WQ4A
-PKAV]; Avery Travis, Code Enforcement on the Lookout for Violations, KAMC
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.everythinglubbock.com/news/kamc-news/codeenforcement-on-the-lookout-for-violations/ [https://perma.cc/XUK4-85HY].
80. See Code Enforcement, LUBBOCK, https://ci.lubbock.tx.us/departments/code
-enforcement/services [https://perma.cc/WQ4A-PKAV]; Sign in, SEECLICKFIX,
https://seeclickfix.com/oauth/login [https://perma.cc/4QYX-W8MF] (showing the
account creation page before submitting a complaint to Lubbock Code Enforcement
Department).
81. See Request a City Service, FORT WORTH, https://fortworth-csrprodcwi.motorolasolutions.com/servicerequest.mvc/srintake
[https://perma.cc/LFJ38AAX]; Code Enforcement Process, SAN ANTONIO, https://www.sanantonio.gov
/ces/Services [https://perma.cc/X5TY-KPFK].
82. See generally Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 161; Rosser, supra note 35 at 33.
83. ZSAKO, supra note 31, at 47.
84. Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 190.
85. Id. at 175–76.
86. Id. at 176.
87. Id.
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she had no money, insurance refused to pay on a foreclosing house,
and lenders refused assistance because she was not the owner.88 Sending the woman to jail would not have accomplished code enforcement’s objective, fixing the roof.89 Rather than taking actions that resolve issues, many code enforcement departments rely on outdated
practices that punish citizens and prevent compliance.90
In addition, code enforcement officers sometimes avoid acting for
fear of harming people in the community.91 One code enforcement officer voiced his concern with imposing actions and fines against “poor
and elderly owner-occupants” stating:
I can’t bother her. She is eighty years old, like my mother.
To fix that would be ten, twelve, thousand dollars. It can’t be
worth that. It would be better for her to put money in the bank
at ten percent and having something to eat.92
In such situations, code enforcement officers see potential intervention
as a negative course of action that harms, rather than benefits, a community.93
In the past two decades, and especially since the 2008 housing
crash which lead to a rise of abandoned and decaying homes,94 some
states have attempted to use super-liens to address inadequate abatement procedures.95 Although many Texas cities allow city officials to
abate nuisances on their own and file liens,96 such liens are treated as
normal liens and fall behind any already existing liens on a property.97
A super-lien takes priority over other liens.98 This allows homeowners, especially those with little money, to pay for abatement, usually
property improvements that make life better, before paying other debts
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See SAN. ANTONIO, TEX., PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE ch. 1, § 106.4
(2018).
91. Urban Decline, supra note 11, at 36; Rosser, supra note 35, at 92.
92. Urban Decline, supra note 11, at 36.
93. See id.
94. Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 184–85.
95. Id. at 181–85 (Louisiana has explicitly authorized super-liens throughout the
state allowing it to recover $3.4 million. Florida and Massachusetts have attempted
to establish super-liens by giving priority to certain liens through select court cases
with marginal success.).
96. See FORT WORTH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, app. B, art. II, §§ 11A-52 to
-54 (2019); LUBBOCK, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 34, § 34.02.035 (2020).
97. Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 181.
98. Id.
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that may keep a property in disrepair.99 Super-liens work better than
fines because they use government money to immediately fix and resolve issues, the stated objective of code enforcement, rather than depriving homeowners of money while simultaneously demanding compliance.100
Abatement and enforcement mechanisms do not address code
harassment. Abatement issues exist in the space between code enforcement officers and property owners and do not include complainants;101 a person who makes a report to code enforcement has no control over code enforcement’s actions.
Although reducing the punitive nature of abatement procedures
can reduce the financial impacts on code harassment victims,102 such
solutions fail to address code harassment’s other consequences. The
peace of mind and reputational damage a victim faces through repeated code enforcement encounters is a harm suffered long before
abatement procedures take place.103 Although important and beneficial, abatement reform is inadequate in addressing code harassment’s
causes or harms.
B. Officer Discretion
Another issue is the large amount of discretion cities and departments grant code enforcement officers.104 When citizens complain, a
small handful of code enforcement officers decide what and how to
investigate and the approach used to resolve issues.105 An investigation from an overzealous, negligent, or untrained officer can have dire
repercussions.106
99. Id. at 182.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 175 (showing that abatement issues are between code enforcement
officers and non-compliant residents).
102. See id. at 181–85.
103. See generally Dallas News Administrator, Sounding Off: Is Code Enforced
in Your Neighborhood?, THE DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 21, 2013, 11:00 AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2013/07/21/sounding-off-is-code-enforced-inyour-neighborhood/ [https://perma.cc/UBV4-7VD6]; Bob LaMendola, Vengeful
Neighbors Trigger ‘Code Terrorism,’ S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 1989), https:
//www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1989-04-30-8901220735-story.html [https:/
/perma.cc/CKQ9-QYX4].
104. See generally Law in Action, supra note 9; Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 161.
105. See Law in Action, supra note 9, at 143–44.
106. See, Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 178; ZSAKO, supra note 31, at 47; Urban
Decline, supra note 11, at 36–38 (“If it honestly takes 300 days to fix a violation I
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For example, in Dallas, an elderly homeowner’s family suggested
a code enforcement officer’s action may have led to the homeowner’s
death.107 A code enforcement officer and a police officer entered and
inspected a 95-year-old homeowner’s home without permission.108
Two days later, the code enforcement officer returned with a caseworker and told the homeowner she would no longer be able to live in
her home.109 The homeowner had never interacted with police or city
representatives and suddenly found a police officer, code enforcement
officer, and caseworker in her home threatening to evict her.110 The
homeowner died of a stroke within two weeks of the events, and her
son suggested that the code enforcement officer caused the homeowner undue stress leading to her death.111 The city fired the officer
stating her behavior was inconsistent with the standards of the code
enforcement department, but this occurred only after seven prior reprimands.112
City officials often dismiss negligent or overzealous incidents as
the mistake of one bad apple or use appeals of “common sense” that a
problem will not occur.113 In a Florida case, for instance, the city attorney told the city council:
If the code enforcement officer receives, for the sake of argument, the 10th complaint on the same property from the
same anonymous source in one month, they’re going to grab
their investigator hat, and they’re going to use their common
sense—and I see it happen—and if there’s not a code violation, that’s the end of it.114
Sometimes, however, cities themselves pressure code enforcement officers to target vulnerable communities. Such a situation
will give the time,” but “if somebody lies to me I will burn them so bad that they
sure ‘nuf won’t forget it.”).
107. Jimmy Isaac, Longview Could Face Lawsuit Over Code Officer’s Behavior,
LONGVIEW NEWS-J. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.news-journal.com/news/local
/longview-could-face-lawsuit-over-code-officers-behavior/article_67ab2ad1-9ea1540e-b126-6a33d01c5dff.html [https://perma.cc/RH22-4JLE].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Jonathan Simmons, What to Do When Code Enforcement Becomes a
Weapon?, PALM COAST OBSERVER (July 8, 2015), https://www.palmcoastobserver.com/article/what-do-when-code-enforcement-becomes-weapon
[https://perma.cc/2QH8-XZK6].
114. Id.
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occurred in the city of Lake Worth, Florida, where a city council member stated in a meeting, “We have to change the demographics, but no
one is willing to say it . . . Lake Worth is the default repository for the
poor and indigent.”115 Another council member wanting “to attract individuals making $60,000 or more annually, preferably with a college
degree” stated, “I want that person. That person probably has a higher
level of education than our average resident.”116 The council members
further stated that law and code enforcement could function as “‘the
stick’ to go after owners of dilapidated properties.”117 Following the
statements, the city used “a $300,000 federal community block grant
to fund a citywide sweep” for violations that primarily targeted lowincome Guatemalan and Haitian residents.118 Code enforcement officers used their discretion to target individuals in the community, for
example, towing specific cars parked on the street or fining the residents of a trailer park.119
The Lake Worth council members’ comments followed a decade
of discriminatory code enforcement practices against Guatemalan and
Haitian residents. In 2006, a Lake Worth police officer entered a Guatemalan apartment to take a crime victim report and simultaneously
scanned the residence for code compliance violations to report to the
code compliance department, a practice that officers did not perform
when taking reports from white residents.120 After reporting the incident to code compliance, 100 Guatemalan residents were forcibly
evacuated from the entire apartment complex.121 Lawyers from the
Florida Equal Justice Center and Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach
County became involved, and the city settled, but the settlement did

115. Francisco Alvarado, Lake Worth Uses Cops, Code Enforcement in Brazen
Effort to Get Rid of City’s Poor, FLA. BULLDOG (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.floridabulldog.org/2019/03/lake-worth-uses-cops-code-enforcement-in-brazen-effort-toget-rid-of-citys-poor/ [https://perma.cc/RPE8-5TAP].
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Nancy Kinnally, Goldstein Award Winners Challenged Selective Code Enforcement, THE FLA. BAR (June 1, 2010), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar
-news/goldstein-award-winners-challenged-selective-code-enforcement
/?fbclid=IwAR1nivcv7s1Mb_G1uG-VzjIfbOvftQxW7JL8L-KxgXD7XfBEpD
_vYY9g5hI [https://perma.cc/7AGA-SZ2E].
121. Id.
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little to prevent the subsequent authorization of discriminatory code
enforcement officer conduct.122
One solution to negligent, overzealous, and discriminatory officer
discretions is the “co-production model,” which revolves around the
community.123 The model uses community organizations that understand the unique needs of their communities, negotiate what standard
the community should abide, and take it upon themselves to abate non
-compliance, for instance, boarding up abandoned houses and keeping
records of suspected drug dealings.124 The approach was “successfully
implemented by several communities in Baltimore” in the late
1990s125 and has seen increased adoption in the past two decades in
various cities across the United States.126 Rather than fining residents
through city-wide standards, members of the community negotiate and
help one another make the community a better place.127 When the
community organizations encounter a problem too difficult to handle
alone, code enforcement provides support through other enforcement
mechanisms.128
An important aspect of the co-production model is that it deprives
code enforcement departments of their potential for abuse.129 Rather
than forcing individual officers to make decisions from their viewpoints alone, the model allows the community to help officers “develop the best strategy . . . while at the same time building up community morale.”130 The result is that officers get “the extra help and
financial resources” they need while “the community gets a code

122. Id.; Francisco Alvarado, Lake Worth Uses Cops, Code Enforcement in Brazen Effort to Get Rid of City’s Poor, FLA. BULLDOG (Mar. 5, 2019), https:/
/www.floridabulldog.org/2019/03/lake-worth-uses-cops-code-enforcement-in-brazen-effort-to-get-rid-of-citys-poor/ [https://perma.cc/9LBR-HTVM].
123. Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 187.
124. Id. at 188.
125. Id.
126. See CITIES RISE: CITIES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. AND STRATEGIC ENF’T, THE
POWER & PROXIMITY OF CODE ENFORCEMENT: A TOOL FOR EQUITABLE
NEIGHBORHOODS 23–25 (June 2019) (describing examples in Minnesota, South Carolina, California, and Kansas); Code Rangers, FORT WORTH, http://cctfortworth.org
/coderangers/#:~:text=The%20Code%20Rangers%20program%20seeks,reports%20of%20suspected%20code%20violations [https://perma.cc/RRL3-5UWT].
127. Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 188.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 190.
130. Id.
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enforcement department that is listening to the community needs, and
working with the residents and not against them.”131
Officer discretion is an additional component leading to code harassment. Oftentimes, a code enforcement officer can flag meritless
complaints and refuse to participate in a harassing complaint.132 But
code officers make mistakes.133 These mistakes can create situations
where a person finds themselves frequently investigated for non-compliance.134
Further, focusing on code enforcement officers ignores the perpetrator of such behavior, the complainant. Because of this, the co-production model fails to address this aspect of code harassment since it
is usually a community member who is creating the harassment.135
Although the co-production model mitigates the harms of officer discretion, it only shifts the authority that can continue to enable code
harassment.
C. Neighborhood Discord
The last code enforcement problem is the legal system’s general
inability to resolve neighbor disputes.136 Oftentimes, code enforcement, law enforcement, and court actions have no effect and even exacerbate conflicts between neighbors.137 In Tennessee, for instance, a
family submitted an anonymous complaint to local code enforcement
against their neighbors.138 Code enforcement responded with a notice
131. Id.
132. See Law in Action, supra note 9, at 143–44.
133. See generally Jimmy Isaac, Longview Could Face Lawsuit Over Code Officer’s Behavior, LONGVIEW NEWS-J. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.news-journal.com/news/local/longview-could-face-lawsuit-over-code-officers-behavior/article_67ab2ad1-9ea1-540e-b126-6a33d01c5dff.html [https://perma.cc/RH22-4JLE].
134. See Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance Harassment, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com
/news/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businesses-cry-codecompliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV]; Bob LaMendola,
Vengeful Neighbors Trigger ‘Code Terrorism,’ S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 30,
1989),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1989-04-30-8901220735story.html [https://perma.cc/CKQ9-QYX4].
135. See Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance Harassment, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com
/news/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businesses-cry-codecompliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV].
136. See generally Blomquist, supra note 13.
137. See generally id. at 336–45.
138. Id. at 400 (citing Levy v. Franks, 159 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).
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of violation to the neighbor.139 The neighbor was able to discover that
the family submitted the anonymous complaint, beginning a six-year
feud complete with death threats, court actions, and harassment.140
During this time, city officials had no effect or ignored the conflict,
court-ordered mediation exacerbated the feud, and judges admonished
both parties equally in court.141
Many code enforcement officers recognize their inability to resolve neighbor disputes.142 Instead of resolving issues, officers sometimes pretend they do not exist.143 Referring to a neighbor who constantly complained, one officer stated, “I know the asshole who made
this complaint. She is always complaining on her neighbor, and never
for any good reason, so why waste time going there? I know it is nothing.”144
Moreover, when complaining neighbors keep submitting complaints, code enforcement officers may take steps against the reporter
to stop the complaints. One officer stated, “When I suspect a vindictive complaint from a neighbor, I go over and write up everything
there. You never hear from them again.”145 Such admissions illustrate
that code enforcement officers are often aware they do not possess the
tools to resolve neighbor disputes and take steps to avoid acting as
intermediaries in the disputes.146
Ironically, many neighbors expect and rely on city officials to resolve such issues.147 A study in New York City found that one-third
of people have never interacted with their neighbors.148 Further, the
study found that people living in “liminal zones,” areas of great racial
diversity, were far more likely to contact code enforcement than people living in areas of low diversity.149 Code enforcement’s inability to
resolve disputes was a contributing factor to the unrest of these areas
139. Id.
140. Id. at 400–05 (citing Levy, 159 S.W.3d at 70).
141. Id.
142. See generally Law in Action, supra note 9, at 143–44.
143. Id. at 144.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 143–44.
147. Id. at 137.
148. Laura Bliss, When Racial Boundaries are Blurry, Neighbors Take Complaints Straight to 311, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 24, 2015, 3:01 PM), https:/
/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-24/neighbors-complain-most-to-311along-fuzzy-racial-boundaries-nyu-study-finds [https://perma.cc/N6DQ-3WCV].
149. Id.
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and increased community tension.150 Scholars, therefore, have criticized the abatement model as inadequate for resolving the problems
that such nuisances actually present.151
Currently, no equitable solution or framework capable of resolving such issues exists.152 This has led some scholars to look internationally for solutions, specifically at the United Kingdom’s “model of
Anti-Social Behavior Orders” (“ASBQs”), which arose from extreme
situations where the “outrageous behavior of one or two families,
groups or individuals [was] apparently beyond the reach of the
law.”153 Such laws allow courts to use criminal penalties, “such as restricted movement,” “even though [a person] may not be guilty of a
criminal offense.”154
Of the three issues scholars have raised concerning problems with
municipal code enforcement, code enforcement officer’s inability to
resolve neighborhood disputes most closely addresses the problem.
Code harassment is, at its core, a conflict between individuals with an
intermediary in between. Although code harassment would not exist
without a code enforcement officer, it is the officer’s inability to manage a dispute that creates the problem.155
However, the creation of a new law based around anti-social behavior would do little to provide relief to code harassment victims.
Such laws could prohibit or stop a neighbor’s actions, but the victim
of harassment still has suffered harm with no legal remedy.156
Accordingly, code harassment is an unaddressed issue. Further,
proposed and enacted solutions to other code enforcement problems
fail to address code harassment because these solutions do not enable
a victim to seek a remedy from the harasser.

150. Id.
151. See Blomquist, supra note 13, at 431–32.
152. See generally id. (detailing dozens of such failures by the American legal
system).
153. Id. at 433.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 400–05 (citing Levy v. Franks, 159 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2004)).
156. See id. at 406 (citing Clanton v. Carr, No. A104203, 2004 WL 2988609, at
*2–5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004)).
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IV. CODE HARASSMENT: AN UNADDRESSED ISSUE
A Texas victim of code harassment has no clear and easy path to
relief in the State’s legal system. This problem is threefold: first, the
Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (“TCPA”) imposes a strict procedural dam for code harassment claims; second, most cities allow anonymous reporting that shields harassers’ identities; and third, there is
no cause of action that directly addresses code harassment. These three
issues prevent causes of action based on code harassment and shield
such harassing conduct from liability.
A. The Texas Citizens Participation Act
The “Texas Citizens Participation Act,” or “Anti-Slaap Law,” is
a procedural dam to code harassment claims.157 The law allows a party
in a legal proceeding to file a motion to dismiss “if [the] legal action
is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of the
right of free speech [or] right to petition . . . .”158 Courts have read the
definition of “right to petition” and “exercise of the right of free
speech” very broadly. 159 For instance, in In re Lipsky, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals decided plaintiffs’ complaints to the EPA, that further appeared in various publications, fell within the TCPA’s definition of “right to petition” and “exercise of the right of free speech.”160
The plaintiffs properly exercised their right to petition because “the
statements at issue were made to encourage the ‘review of an issue’ . . . by a ‘governmental body.’”161 The exercise of right of free
speech was the basis of the plaintiff’s actions because the complaint
was “made in connection with a matter of public concern.”162

157. Laurel L. Baker, Limitations of the Texas Citizens Participation Act,
LAW.COM (Jan. 5, 2021, 03:00 PM), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2021/01/05
/limitations-of-the-texas-citizens-participation-act/
[https://perma.cc/3UYXGQPU].
158. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a) (2011) (amended 2019).
159. See In re Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d 530, 543 (Tex App.—Fort Worth Apr. 22,
2013, pet. denied); Cunningham v. Waymire, 612 S.W.3d 47, 57–59 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
160. 411 S.W.3d at 541–42, 545, 548.
161. Id. at 542 (finding the communications to the public at large were “based on
[plaintiff’s] strategy to involve the EPA”).
162. Id. at 542–43 (reasoning that chemicals in the drinking well were a health
risk, and fracking could affect others).

162

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 8

After Lipsky, complainants have used the TCPA to stop defamation or slander suits based on their reports to code enforcement.163 In
Maldonado v. Franklin, a court determined that a defendant’s complaints to code enforcement about a plaintiff’s treatment of an outside
dog were “communications made in connection with a matter of public
concern.”164 Looking at the San Antonio municipal code, the court determined that San Antonio had made the welfare of an outside dog a
matter of public concern and the TCPA protected the defendant’s complaints.165 Therefore, code enforcement complaints, so long as they
conform to nuisances contained within the city ordinance code, are
protected speech subject to a TCPA dismissal.166
B. Anonymous Reporting
Anonymous reporting is meant to protect reporters from the people they report, as a case in Salt Lake City, Utah, demonstrates.167 In
2018, a man killed a code enforcement officer, lit her truck on fire,
and set fire to the neighbor’s house he falsely blamed for reporting
him.168 The man had a history of code enforcement violations for
“misdemeanor weed-control and bulky waste-accumulation
charges.”169 Notably, a week before the murder, the man accused the
same neighbor of making the report, but she denied it.170
Anonymity exists to allow people to make reports without fear of
retaliation, but anonymity also allows code harassers to act free of consequences because the victim of harassment is unable to find out who
the harasser is. Most cities in Texas allow anonymous online reporting
that collects no personal information from a reporter; in such situations, a request for information from the code compliance department
would reveal no information besides the complaint’s content.171 Thus,
163. See Maldonado v. Franklin, No. 04-18-00819-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS
8747 (4th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex. Sep. 30, 2019).
164. Id. at *7.
165. Id. at *8 (San Antonio’s municipal code “establishe[d] minimum standards
of care to safeguard humane care and treatment of animals.”).
166. See id.
167. Lindsay Whitehurst, Man Says He Killed City Worker Over Yard Rule ‘Harassment,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/article
/bde88b80d72147859f5d6a7a4d621ef2 [https://perma.cc/9CET-46TX].
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Check Service Request Status, FORT WORTH, https://fortworth-
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a victim of code harassment seeking to bring an anonymous harasser
into court has two options: file an anonymous lawsuit in the hopes of
later discovering the identity of the harasser or submit a suit based on
a guess as to the who the harasser is and risk dismissal under the
TCPA.
Anonymous lawsuits, also known as John/Jane Doe suits, are not
accepted in Texas and are dismissed172 unless specifically allowed by
statute.173 In Dallas, for instance, a pro se litigant attempted to bring a
defamation claim against an unknown person who reported what he
called a “false complaint” to code enforcement.174 The litigant later
had to amend his complaint to include the neighbor he blamed for the
complaint against him.175
Alternatively, a plaintiff must sue a defendant and risk TCPA dismissal because the plaintiff cannot prove the defendant made a code
enforcement report. Once a defendant invokes the TCPA, plaintiffs
must prove “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each
essential element of the claim in question,” or the court will dismiss
the complaint.176 The TCPA “does not define what sort of evidence
satisfies the ‘clear and specific’ qualitative standard.”177 In cases unrelated to the TCPA, Texas courts have said that evidence that supports a prima facie case is the “minimum quantum of evidence

csrprodcwi.motorolasolutions.com/StatusCheck.mvc/StatusCheck [https://perma.cc
/A65F-EYV5]; Code Enforcement Process, SAN ANTONIO, https://www.sanantonio.gov/ces/Services
[https://perma.cc/X5TY-KPFK];
Code
Enforcement,
LUBBOCK, https://ci.lubbock.tx.us/departments/code-enforcement/services [https:/
/perma.cc/WQ4A-PKAV] (showing the account creation page before submitting a
complaint to Lubbock Code Enforcement Department).
172. Riston v. Doe #1, 161 S.W.3d 525, 528–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
173. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.0045(b), (d) (allowing the filing of a
John/Jane Doe suit to prevent the statute of limitations from running in personal
injury cases involving sexual assault).
174. Complaint for Injunction & Declaratory Relief at 12–13, Khan v. City of
Dallas, No. 3:15-CV-3254-D, 2016 WL 3910859, (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2016).
175. Amended Complaint for Injunction & Declaratory Relief at p. 4, Khan v.
City of Dallas, No. 3:15-CV-3254-D, 2016 WL 3910859, (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2016).
Note that even if Texas allowed anonymous lawsuits, their purpose is to grant a
plaintiff time to discover the identity of a defendant. Anonymous reporting leaves
no record of a reporter’s identity, therefore, the time extension an anonymous lawsuit provides would serve no purpose. See Riston, 161 S.W.3d at 530.
176. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b)–(c).
177. In re Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tex App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. denied) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a)).
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necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is
true.”178 The plaintiff must provide evidence external to the pleadings.179 Although the TCPA allows the court to permit “specified and
limited discovery relevant to [a] motion[,]”180 it restricts the admissible evidence at the pleading stage to the pleadings and supporting affidavits.181 Therefore, the exception has little applicability to helping
a party overcome the procedural hurdle.
Texas courts have yet to apply the TCPA’s evidentiary standard
to anonymous code harassment, but a case from Austin, Texas demonstrates how a court might apply the evidentiary standard. In Neyland
v. Thompson, a plaintiff successfully demonstrated a prima facie case
for defamation against four defendants the plaintiff alleged created
and distributed anonymous fliers to neighbors.182 The plaintiff provided clear and specific evidence that the defendants published the
pamphlets using an eyewitness affidavit, one of the defendants distributed the fliers, and the other three defendants lack of a denial that they
published the fliers.183 Without a denial from the other three defendants, the presence of evidence showing one of the defendants was in
contact with defaming material was enough to move Thompson’s
claim from suspicion to a rational inference.184
Thompson’s case shows that a court likely would have dismissed
the Dallas pro se litigant’s lawsuit against his neighbor—described
above—as mere suspicion. The amended complaint stated: “In or
about January of 2015, Plaintiff’s disgruntled neighbor . . . anonymously filed a false complaint with the City of Dallas.”185 The
178. Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 233 (Tex.
2004)).
179. Gensetix, Inc. v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 616 S.W.3d 630, 639 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).
180. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(b).
181. Amy Bresnen et al., Targeting the Texas Citizen Participation Act: The 2019
Texas Legislature’s Amendments to a Most Consequential Law, 52 ST. MARY’S L.J.
63, 120 (2020).
182. Neyland v. Thompson, No. 03-13-00643-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3337,
at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (The first flier was
signed anonymously, and the second was signed “Your concerned neighbors of
Sunchase.”).
183. Id. at *22 (“[They] do not dispute that they made the statements alleged to
be defamatory.”).
184. Id. at *22 n.8 (showing that the defendant the affidavit was against appealed
separately from the other three defendants).
185. Am. Compl. for Inj. & Declaratory Relief, at 4, Khan, No. 3:15-CV-3254-D,
2016 WL 3910859 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
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complaint further stated the neighbor “demanded that the blue tarp be
replaced with a beige color tarp; as it did not please her taste of color”
and that his “immediate family members and visiting friends heard
[the neighbor] complaining.”186 The pro se litigant provided no supporting affidavits or evidence to support his three factual claims.187
Unlike the evidence in Thompson, the pro se litigant had no testimony
to show that his neighbor made the actual anonymous complaint; he
merely alleged that his neighbor disliked the color of the tarp he used.
Without evidence connecting the neighbor and the anonymous complaint, the neighbor could deny submitting the complaint to code enforcement. The TCPA’s evidentiary standard at the pleading stage,
therefore, makes surviving motions to dismiss nearly insurmountable
in situations where a code harasser is anonymous.188 Anonymous reporting, when combined with the TCPA, becomes a shield that code
harassers can use to avoid liability.
C. Molding Causes of Action
After identifying a code harasser, a person must still have a viable
cause of action to sue the harasser. Unlike criminal law that punishes
false reports to police officers or harassment itself, no clear law provides a civil remedy for code harassment, so lawyers must cobble various claims from tort law.189
1. Criminal Law
Two failed criminal causes of action are false reporting and harassment. A false reporting claim offers Texas citizens no relief from
code harassment because code enforcement officials are not police officers.190 A person is guilty of false reporting “if, with intent to deceive, [the person] knowingly makes a false statement that is material

186. Id.
187. Id.at 4–6.
188. Id. at 4–5. See Neyland, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3337, at *22.
189. See generally Long Canyon Phase II & III Homeowners Ass’n v. Cashion,
517 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (suing for intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, and negligence); Cunningham v. Waymire, No. 14-17-00883-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 9253, at *52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 22, 2019, no pet.) (suing for “libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligence, and conspiracy”).
190. See Section I supra; Uzdavines, supra note 22, at 163.
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to a criminal investigation.”191 The person must make the statement
“to a peace officer or federal special investigator conducting the investigation; . . . any employee of a law enforcement agency that is authorized by the agency to conduct the investigation and that actor
knows is conducting the investigation; or a corrections officer or
jailer.”192
Nor does code harassment qualify as criminal harassment. Texas
does not recognize civil harassment as an independent cause of action.193 Criminal harassment occurs when, “with intent to harass,” a
person:
(1) initiates communication and makes an obscene “comment,
request, suggestion, or proposal”;
(2) “threatens . . . to inflict bodily injury . . . or to commit a felony against [a] person,” or the person’s family, house members, or property;
(3) falsely reports that “another person has suffered death or serious bodily injury”;
(4) repeatedly telephones another person “anonymously or in a
manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend”;
(5) makes and “intentionally fails to hang up or disengage” a telephone call;
(6) “knowingly permits a telephone under the person’s control to
be used” for harassment; or
(7) “sends repeated electronic communications . . . reasonably
likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or
offend another.”194
Although many actions in the statute, such as sending electronic
communications when making an online report or repeatedly making
telephone calls, align with code harassment, the statute first requires
intent from the harasser.195 For harassment, intent is result-oriented
and occurs if the result of the conduct is the perpetrator’s conscious
objective.196 The code enforcement officer is an intermediary that
191. TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.08(a).
192. Id.
193. Van Gilder v. Van Gilder, No. 03-18-00258-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
4804, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Austin June 28, 2018, no pet.).
194. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.07(a). An electronic communication is “a transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted
in whole or in part by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical
systems.” Id. at § 42.07(b)(1).
195. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.07(a).
196. Blount v. State, 961 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997,
writ ref’d).
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disrupts this direct action and shields the harasser from criminal liability because the harasser intends to make a report that causes a city
employee to harass another person.197 The problems code harassment
creates are, therefore, beyond the reach of current criminal law.
2. Tort Law
Tort law fails to provide an adequate solution for victims of code
harassment. Lawyers often use a variety of torts, notably defamation,
as causes of action against code harassment, but these causes of action
fail to provide relief for future harms, and defamation has critical flaws
in addressing code harassment.198
In California, for example, a neighbor began a “‘campaign of harassment’ that the appellate court opined was ‘not hyperbole’” after a
court-ordered mediation should have solved the dispute.199 For three
years, the neighbor would operate a chainsaw outside of a victim’s
bedroom even “while it was raining, and even when it was snowing.”200 The victim was able to bring a court action for numerous torts,
including “intentional infliction of emotional distress, nuisance, trespass, and/or invasion of privacy” and won “$90,000 in compensatory
damages . . . and $5,000 in punitive damages,” but still had to move to
a different neighborhood because the neighbor continued to harass
him.201 Although the victim was compensated for the past damages he
suffered, tort law was powerless to prevent future harm, and the victim
had to sell and leave his home.
In addition, courts are very unlikely to use injunctions to restrict
people’s access to state municipal resources.202 Like code harassment,
vexatious litigation occurs when a person uses repeated litigation to
197. See id.
198. See Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 101 (Tex. 2014) (“[An] injunction
prohibiting future speech based on that adjudication impermissibly threatens to
sweep protected speech into its prohibition and is an unconstitutional infringement.”); Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 263 (Tex. 2014) (citing Hancock v.
Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 71 (Tex. 2013)) (“A party may not recover exemplary
damages unless the plaintiff establishes actual damages.”).
199. Blomquist, supra note 13, at 405 (citing Clanton v. Carr, No. A104203, 2004
WL 2988609, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004)).
200. Id. at 406 (citing Clanton, 2004 WL 2988609, at *1).
201. Id. (citing Clanton, 2004 WL 2988609 at *2–5).
202. See Chris Colby, Comment, There’s a New Sheriff in Town: The Texas Vexatious Litigants Statute and Its Application to Frivolous and Harassing Litigation,
31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1291, 1297 (2000).
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harass another.203 Texas courts had injunctions as a tool to restrict vexatious litigation, but were hesitant to issue them and reserved them
primarily for cases where a lawsuit was filed in multiple states.204
Texas courts’ failure to use injunction to curb vexatious litigation
caused the Texas Legislature to create a vexatious litigation statute to
solve the problem.205
A common cause of action brought against code harassment is
defamation,206 where a defendant negligently “publishe[s] a false
statement” defaming the plaintiff and causing damages.207 Defamation
does not provide a solution to code harassment because code harassment can involve the publishment of true statements just as much as
false statements and the “qualified privilege” defense threatens to raise
the degree of fault to malice.208
Looking at the first failure, defamation claims protect peoples’
reputations from false statements.209 Therefore, 100 complaints to
code enforcement claiming a neighbor’s grass is not to code, if true,
are not actionable as defamation. Further, many ordinances are variable conditions that can be true when reported and false when investigated.210 For instance, imagine a harasser reports his neighbor when
the neighbor’s grass is an inch above code. A day after the report, the
neighbor mows his lawn. When a code enforcement officer arrives to
investigate, the grass is below an actionable length, but the neighbor’s
203. Id. at 1292.
204. Id. at 1297.
205. Id. at 1293.
206. See generally In re Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d 530, 537 (Tex App.—Fort Worth
2013, pet. denied) (suing for defamation, business disparagement, and civil conspiracy); Neyland v. Thompson, No. 03-13-00643-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3337, at
*16 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 7, 2015, no pet.) (suing for libel per se and slander per
se); Cunningham v. Waymire, 612 S.W.3d 52, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2019, no pet.) (suing for libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and conspiracy).
207. D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. 2017);
see also Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“Damages . . . include compensation for injuries to reputation or character, mental anguish and other like wrongs
incapable of money valuation.”).
208. Dixon v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1980).
209. Austin v. Inet Tech., Inc., 118 S.W.3d 491, 496 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003,
no pet.).
210. Jonathan Simmons, What to Do When Code Enforcement Becomes a
Weapon?, PALM COAST OBSERVER (July 8, 2015), https://www.palmcoastobserver.com/article/what-do-when-code-enforcement-becomes-weapon
[https://perma.cc/2QH8-XZK6].
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report at the time was true. Even after 50 repetitions of this situation,
the harasser’s statements are not false, so the neighbor has no defamation cause of action. Yet, the neighbor is still subject to multiple visits
from code enforcement officers attempting to do their jobs.
Defamation’s second failure is the qualified privilege defense, applying where “one of several persons” with a common interest makes
a statement “in a lawful manner and for a lawful purpose” with the
reasonable belief that another person is entitled to know.211 A report
to code enforcement invokes a qualified privilege defense because it
reports potential matters of public concern to code enforcement officers.212 In Honeycutt v. Forest Cove Property Owners’ Association, a
letter the defendants sent to four high school administrators about a
plaintiff hosting high school parties on his property was conditionally
privileged.213 Given that students’ health and safety fell within the
school official’s duties and was of common interest to the community,
the defendants reasonably believed that school officials and other
neighbors were entitled to know about the plaintiff’s conduct.214
The qualified privilege defense is likely to apply in defamation
suits for the same reason. Like school officials whose duty is to protect
the health and safety of students, code enforcement officers have a
duty to protect the city from nuisances.215 Nuisances affect the community, so residents could reasonably believe that code enforcement
officers, whose duty is to resolve such issues, are entitled to know
about potential violations.
To overcome the privilege, the plaintiff must show that the harasser made the communication with actual malice,216 defined as
“knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard” that a “false
defamatory statement was made with a high degree of awareness of
[its] probable falsity.”217 A plaintiff bringing a defamation claim
211. Dixon, 607 S.W.2d at 242.
212. See Honeycutt v. Forest Cove Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, No. 14-98-01255-CV,
2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3173, at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 17,
2001, no pet.).
213. Id. at *1–3, *13.
214. Id. at *13–14 (“School officials have a common interest in protecting the
health and safety of their students on and off school grounds.”).
215. See Law in Action, supra note 9, at 149; ZSAKO, supra note 31, at 6.
216. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O’Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1970); Ramos
v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ)
(plaintiff bears the burden of proving malice).
217. Foster v. Upchurch, 624 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1981).
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against a code harasser, therefore, must show the harasser made each
report with malice. Such a requirement ignores the nature of code harassment. The aggregated behavior rather than the individual complaints is the issue; it is the cumulation of all the complaints together
rather than the details of each complaint that makes the conduct defamatory.218
Defamation is a square peg for a round hole. The tort can combat
code harassment but, like Tort law in general, is incapable of addressing the problem on its own.
V. CREATING A SOLUTION
Code harassment has no simple solution. Its three components—
the TCPA, anonymous reporting, and no cause of action—operate as
a single whole and solving one component without the others would
only allow the problem to continue. The following Section outlines
plausible reforms that would address code harassment’s root causes
and offer relief to victims.
A. Rolling Back the Texas Citizens Participation Act
To address code harassment, the Texas Legislature needs to reform the TCPA. As shown in Section IV of this Comment, code harassers invoke the TCPA using its broad language.219 The TCPA’s
broad reach was not exclusive to code harassment and had similar effects on nearly every type of litigation in the State.220 “From April
2018 until April 2019, the Office of Court Administration reported
99,300 filed documents referenc[ing] the TCPA.”221 Judges and attorneys requested the Texas Legislature amend the law, and, on September 1, 2019, the Legislature created a new version with only one vote

218. Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance Harassment,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com/news
/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businesses-cry-code-compliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV]; Betsy Calvert, Code Enforcement Starts With Neighbors, Ends With Government, SUN PORT CHARLOTTE (Apr.
12, 2019), https://www.yoursun.com/charlotte/news/code-enforcement-starts-withneighbors-ends-with-government/article_217c3096-4a70-11e9-96baab64eac85ce6.html [https://perma.cc/CGB3-XDNF].
219. See Bresnen et al., supra note 181, at 61.
220. See id. at 62.
221. Id.
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against it.222 Two notable changes of the amended law have some applicability to code harassment but are unlikely to have any serious effect on the issue.
The first change narrowed the initial application of the TCPA.223
Before the amendment, the statute stated, “a court shall dismiss a legal
action against the moving party if the moving party shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on, relates to,
or is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech [or]
right to petition.”224 Now, the statute states, “a court shall dismiss a
legal action against the moving party if the moving party demonstrates
that the legal action is based on or is in response to a party’s exercise
of the right of free speech [or] right to petition.”225
The two alterations to the statutory text were substituting the “preponderance of the evidence standard” with the word “demonstrates”
and the removal of the phrase “relates to.” The removal of the preponderance of the evidence standard prevents the court from having to
apply a broad interpretation of the statute because the word “demonstrates” is not yet defined.226 Judges, therefore, will have a greater, but
not unlimited, amount of discretion in determining whether to dismiss
a case.227 The removal of the phrase “relates to” attempts to prohibit
the broad application of the law to issues the legislature never intended
the law to impact, such as matters in probate court.228 Now, courts may
be able to sever extraneous cases the legislature never intended the
statute to apply to through a narrow interpretation of the words “based
on” and “in response to.”229
Unfortunately, the change is unlikely to impact code harassment
because reports to code compliance are a direct petition to the government.230 Code harassers have been able to invoke the TCPA using the

222. Id. at 55.
223. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a) (comparing the 2011 statute with
the 2019 amendment).
224. § 27.005(b).
225. § 27.003(a).
226. Bresnen et al., supra note 181, at 116.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 61, 113.
229. See id.
230. See In re Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tex App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet.
denied); Cunningham v. Waymire, 612 S.W.3d 47, 67, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
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“based on” language, the strongest application of the statute.231 Although the amendment does not provide a direct solution to the statute’s protection of harassing behavior, it does illustrate a state-wide
acknowledgement that the law has been overly broad and may be a
sign of future changes.
The second change impacts the admissible evidence a court can
consider in a TCPA motion to dismiss.232 Under the old law, a court
could only consider pleadings and supporting affidavits.233 After the
amendment, a court can consider the “types of evidence allowed under
the summary-judgement rule: deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, admissions, stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records.”234 The inclusion of new types of evidence promises to add more weight to a judge’s decision to allow additional
discovery under a motion to dismiss.235 Although such a change promises to have some positive effect on defeating TCPA motions, the
amendment is unlikely to impact code harassment where evidence is
nearly impossible to gather.236
Despite the amendments offering little solution to code harassment, the additional exceptions added to the law offer an avenue for
future reform. The original law had four exemptions that shielded four
types of cases from the TCPA.237 The amendment added 15 new exemptions, including cases involving evictions, common law fraud
claims, and survivors of sexual assault.238 Including code harassment
among these exemptions would be a method of removing TCPA protections from code harassers without relying on judicial interpretations
or complicated statutory construction. For instance, an exemption
could apply against defamation claims where the defendant has submitted 50 or more complaints to a municipal code compliance department. Although the TCPA has undergone extensive reform, its broad
overreach and harsh evidentiary requirements promise to protect code
harassment until the legislature addresses the problem with further reforms.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d at 543; Cunningham, 612 S.W.3d at 67, 71.
Bresnen et al., supra note 181, at 115–20.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 117.
See id.
See generally supra Section IV(b).
Bresnen et al., supra note 181, at 100.
Id. at 101–05.
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B. Transitioning Anonymous Reporting to Confidential Reporting
Cities need to transition from anonymous to confidential reporting systems. Proponents of anonymous reporting argue that it protects
reporters from retaliation.239 Without anonymous reporting, people
would be unwilling and unable to make use of code compliance240 for
fear of retaliation and harm from neighbors.241 However, adopting a
confidential reporting system, where code enforcement documents a
reporter’s identity but protects it from the public, is a solution that retains the protections advocates of the anonymous system endorse
while addressing the problem of code harassment.
Municipalities should require complainants to provide their identity to authorities. In exchange, their identities could be confidential
and exempt from disclosure under the Texas Public Information Act,
which requires governmental authorities to disclose information to citizens on request.242 The legislature could add an exception to the
Texas Public Information, limiting a retaliatory neighbor’s access to a
complainant’s identity.243 In this way, the information would be available only during discovery in litigation involving code harassment244
but hidden from neighbors seeking to punish a neighbor for filing a
single report.
Nor would the switch from anonymous to confidential reporting
deter people from reporting code violations. For example, Lubbock
functions without anonymous or confidential reporting.245 Lubbock
citizens must create and log into an account to access the online complaint form.246 This means Lubbock citizens cannot anonymously
239. Jonathan Simmons, What to Do When Code Enforcement Becomes a
Weapon?, PALM COAST OBSERVER (July 8, 2015), https://www.palmcoastobserver.com/article/what-do-when-code-enforcement-becomes-weapon
[https://perma.cc/2QH8-XZK6].
240. Id.
241. Lindsay Whitehurst, Man Says He Killed City Worker Over Yard Rule ‘Harassment,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/article
/bde88b80d72147859f5d6a7a4d621ef2 [https://perma.cc/9CET-46TX].
242. TEX GOV’T CODE § 552.001.
243. See § 552.1175(a)(8) (protecting police officers’ identities); § 552.002(18)
(protecting government settlement agreements).
244. § 552.0055 (discovery requests are not a “request for information”).
245. Code Enforcement, LUBBOCK, https://ci.lubbock.tx.us/departments/code-enforcement/services [https://perma.cc/WQ4A-PKAV]; Sign in, SEECLICKFIX, https:/
/seeclickfix.com/oauth/login [https://perma.cc/4QYX-W8MF].
246. Code Enforcement, LUBBOCK, https://ci.lubbock.tx.us/departments/code-enforcement/services [https://perma.cc/WQ4A-PKAV]; Sign in, SEECLICKFIX, https:/

174

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 8

report. However, many citizens continue to regularly contact code enforcement for problems such as high weeds and junked vehicles.247
The lack of an anonymous complaint system has not completely deterred Lubbock citizens’ use of code compliance.248 Therefore, requiring complainants to provide their identity in exchange for making the
information confidential to the public is an equitable solution that balances the complainant’s privacy with the need to identify harassing
reporters.
C. Creating a Vexatious Reporting Law
Available causes of action fail to directly address code harassment. Without a clear cause of action, people cannot take the
knowledge that a specific person is harassing them and legally force
them to stop. Fortunately, Texas’s vexatious litigant law offers a clear
model for creating a vexatious reporter law.249
A court may find a plaintiff a vexatious litigant if a defendant
shows that there is not a reasonable probability the plaintiff will succeed and the plaintiff:
(1) “commence[s], prosecute[s], or maintain[s] at least five litigations” pro se that were “determined adverse,” left pending
for two years, or dismissed as frivolous;
(2) attempts “to relitigate, pro se,” a previous cause of action
“arising out of the same controversy”; or
(3) is already “a vexatious litigant in a case arising out of the
same controversy.”250
A court may prohibit a vexatious litigant from filing new litigation251
or require a security to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees if the
court later dismisses the litigation.252
There are four noteworthy features of the vexatious litigant law
allowing it to function:
/seeclickfix.com/oauth/login [https://perma.cc/4QYX-W8MF] (showing the account creation page before submitting a complaint to Lubbock Code Enforcement
Department).
247. City of Lubbock Monthly Code Cases, ARCGIS INSIGHTS, https://insights.arcgis.com/index.html#/view/675d4ea644c1494bb2b871e41393e8e2 (last
visited Oct. 15, 2021) (Filtering the reported code cases by month shows Lubbock
citizens made 1,814 reports to Lubbock Code Compliance during January 2021).
248. Id.
249. See supra Section IV(c)(2).
250. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.054(1)–(3).
251. § 11.101(a).
252. §§ 11.055(a), (c), 11.057.
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(1) there is a bright-line rule for the number of suits (five), during
a seven-year period;253
(2) the law still allows for meritorious claims;254
(3) every judge may block litigation up front;255 and
(4) a vexatious litigant with a meritorious claim must post security.256
The first feature, that there is a bright-line rule for the number of suits,
limits the court’s ability to label people as vexatious litigants because
the person must meet an objective standard of unreasonableness.257
The second feature, that the law still allows for meritorious claims,
allows the law to survive three constitutional challenges: First Amendment deprivation, vagueness, and overbreadth.258 The third feature,
every judge may block litigation up front, allows judges to prevent the
harassment before it begins, a process made simple with a public list
of vexatious litigants maintained and updated online.259 The fourth
feature, a vexatious litigant with a meritorious claim must post security, imposes a steep financial penalty for each filed litigation that
many vexatious litigants cannot afford with their persistent behavior.260
Using the four primary features of the vexatious litigant statute as
a guide, a vexatious reporter statute would first need to establish a
bright-line rule triggering the statute.261 A rule with a minimum
threshold would prevent code enforcement departments from using the
statute to silence complaints. In drafting this requirement, lawmakers
would need to consult with code compliance officers to determine
what number of complaints are considered unacceptable harassment,
whether all or some of the reports need to be false, and whether the

253. See Colby, supra note 202, at 1323.
254. See id. at 1343–44.
255. See id. at 1339–40.
256. See id. at 1331.
257. See Barker v. Hutt, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5565, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—
Eastland July 12, 2012, no pet.).
258. See Sparkman v. Microsoft Corp., No. 12-13-00175-CV, 2015 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2510, at *8–15 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 18, 2015, pet. denied).
259. See Vexatious Litigants, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/judicial-data/vexatious-litigants/ [https://perma.cc/X8TX-LPL7].
260. See Sparkman, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2510, at *8–15 (confirming the dismissal of a case because a registered vexatious litigant failed to furnish a $7,500
security); Colby, supra note 202, at 1304.
261. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.054(1)–(2); Colby, supra note 202,
at 1323.
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law should focus on complaints made against one person or complaints made by a specific person.
Next, a vexatious reporter statute would need to hamper, but not
outright prevent, complaints to code enforcement from vexatious reporters.262 This protects free speech rights and ensures that a court will
not strike the law on constitutional grounds.263
Third, a vexatious reporter statute would need to require code enforcement departments to review reports for plausibility from known
vexatious reporters.264 This would require code enforcement agencies
to review vexatious reporter’s complaints before making them public
or investigating them. A code enforcement officer would have to read
or discuss the claim, assess it, and take responsibility for accepting it.
This process, like a judge reviewing the merits of a litigation case,
establishes a roadblock that prevents officers from interacting with the
intended victim.
Lastly, a vexatious reporter statute would need to require vexatious reporters to pay money to make complaints.265 This imposes financial penalties onto a system that is otherwise free.266 A vexatious
reporter who would report every person in a neighborhood will have
to assess whether she can afford such behavior. Adding money into
the system curbs harassing behavior while still allowing the person the
opportunity to make her neighborhood a better place.
More importantly, creating a cause of action would promote judicial efficiency. Currently, victims of code harassment mold and argue
claims, such as defamation, to enter court.267 Attorneys add claims,
like negligence and even private nuisance, because the law is unclear
on what causes of action address this issue.268 Judges, therefore, devote significant resources to researching, analogizing, and trying such

262. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.101(a); Colby, supra note 202, at
1343–44.
263. See Sparkman, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2510, at *8–15.
264. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.101(a); Colby, supra note 202, at
1339–40.
265. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 11.055(a), (c), 11.057; Colby, supra note
202, at 1331.
266. Request a City Service, FORT WORTH, https://fortworth-csrprodcwi.motorolasolutions.com/servicerequest.mvc/srintake
[https://perma.cc/LFJ38AAX] (charging no fee for the submission of a complaint).
267. See supra Section IV(c)(2).
268. See id.
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cases.269 A clear cause of action with well-established limits and
boundaries would allow judges to dismiss claims filed under improper
causes of action while addressing the issue when properly presented.
Ultimately, creating a cause of action for code enforcement not only
allows victims to gain relief, but also eases the strain such cases place
on the legal system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cities have focused their efforts on protecting reporters from
vengeful neighbors but, in the process, created a system that enables
some reporters to harass their neighbors. This Comment has shown
how these protections have extended too far.270 In Texas, the TCPA,
anonymous reporting, and the lack of a specific cause of action are
three issues that enable code harassment.271 Creating a solution to the
problem requires a simultaneous three-pronged approach that aims to
retain the positive parts of these three systems while minimizing their
negative aspects.272 As a balanced solution, this Comment advocates
for the Texas Legislature to add code compliance complaints as an
exception to the TCPA, cities to transition from anonymous to confidential reporting systems, and the Texas Legislature to create a vexatious reporter statute.273
Although code harassment has historically been a local problem
confined to neighborhood disputes,274 the internet has expanded the
problem’s reach.275 As the closure of DIY spaces shows, people and
groups will be able to use anonymous reporting to retaliate against political opponents or attack marginalized groups.276 Without creating a
solution that addresses the problem today, code harassment could expand into a national tool of harassment.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that injecting additional oversight measures into the code enforcement process is the best way to
269. See id.
270. See supra Section IV.
271. Id.
272. See supra Section V.
273. Id.
274. See generally Bob LaMendola, Vengeful Neighbors Trigger ‘Code Terrorism,’ S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 1989), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl
-xpm-1989-04-30-8901220735-story.html [https://perma.cc/CKQ9-QYX4].
275. See generally DIY, supra note 15.
276. Id.
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fight code harassment. Hopefully, such oversight can catch the instances when code enforcement departments fail and prevent situations where a neighbor with a tape measure forces another person to
abandon her home.277

277. See Gilbert Garcia, Beacon Hill Businesses Cry Code-Compliance Harassment, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.expressnews.com
/news/news_columnists/gilbert_garcia/article/Beacon-Hill-businesses-cry-codecompliance-10124431.php [https://perma.cc/DEW9-U4YV].

